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David Ohana’s Albert Camus and the Critique of Violence begins with a 
truism: “The short life, works and intellectual outlook of Albert Camus were almost 
all connected with the question of violence” (1). The violence about which Camus 
wrote is well known, including war, revolution, totalitarianism, terrorism, and the 
death penalty. The book closes with personal revelations linking the author to 
Camus, whom he describes as an “inspiration for me” and an “inexhaustible store 
of insight” (158). Ohana here tells of his Moroccan birth in a town that Camus’s 
father reportedly participated in conquering as a member of French colonial forces.  
Ohana’s structure—reflected in the main sections of the book—is that of 
“[t]hree main metaphors of western culture” through which Camus’s understanding 
of violence will be discussed. These are the binding of Prometheus, the sacrifice of 
Isaac, and the crucifixion of Jesus (7). It is in the final section that Ohana discusses 
the idea of a distinctive “Mediterranean humanism,” which might have served well 
as a stronger organizing principle of a book that is really an extended essay, with 
sections rather than chapters.  
While Ohana’s Camus, translated from Hebrew by David Maisel, examines 
several of Camus’s novels, plays, and other works of literature, it is not a work of 
literary criticism; rather, the focus is on political analysis. Ohana brings in various 
less common interlocutors for Camus rather than concentrating on the traditional 
“usual suspect,” Jean-Paul Sartre. As Ohana summarizes it, a long due “respect” is 
owed Camus for his (Promethean) humanism, his opposition to “abstract radicalism 
and all-justifying violence,” and his “spontaneous, simple and succinct” responses 
to the problems of living freely and humanly in a world without intrinsic meaning 
or purpose (158). What Ohana most admires in Camus is that the French author 
took a brave and principled stance against violence and oppression and did so 
consistently, almost alone on many issues and in any case earlier than others, 
refusing to glorify violence as either privileged and/or necessary, or as an absolute 
or end in itself. 
Ohana’s heroic portrayal of Camus is due to the latter’s rejection of 
“metaphysical temptations” (most notably of violence) and his insistence that 
humans must act in pursuit of justice without demand or expectation of redemption 
(religious or otherwise). They should thus, in this view, accept absurdity, chaos, 
and isolation even within human relationships and communities, while choosing a 
precisely measured middle between the extremes of victim and executioner; such a 
choice would be “rebellion,” equidistant from the violence of both state authority, 
most especially in its totalitarian form, and of the revolutionary, who opts 
collectively or individually for unlimited means in pursuit of an ideological vision 
and/or self-fulfillment. Neither nihilistic (in his later view) nor utopian, Camus 
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encouraged moral action that respects both the rational and the sacred, avoiding the 
“sanctification of politics” that has emerged after the death of God and that exalts 
abstractions and absolutes over living human beings and valorizes “man” along 
with violence (of the ideological or political sort) as the successor to divine or 
transcendental violence. 
Ohana shows us a Camus who, via World War II and the Holocaust 
especially, came to the position of “Promethean humanism.” The bound 
Prometheus, who liberates himself, is a rejection of the sacrificed (associated with 
Isaac) and the crucified (associated with Jesus), though offering some aspects of 
these, and at the same time a rejection of their oppressors and ultimately killers. 
However, while offering a somewhat different framework for looking at Camus, 
Ohana’s understanding of Camus is familiar. The more original framework he 
suggests for understanding Camus—that of Mediterranean humanism, which is 
non-nationalistic and stresses pluralism—is not especially developed in this essay. 
Ohana, a professor at an Israeli university, though, has written elsewhere of it and 
has established a program for its study. Indeed, in an earlier book, Israel and Its 
Mediterranean Identity (2011), Ohana had written about how “many Israelis” 
consider Camus in terms almost identical to how he here presents his personal 
feelings. 
The book as a whole has a somewhat disjointed quality, with myriad themes 
and issues touched upon but often in a way that does not allow them to cohere fully 
with the larger tripartite structure announced at the start and reflected in section 
titles. Ohana moves in many directions, proposing categories and structures of 
analysis and raising issues, which are then often dropped. For example, in the 
book’s title, Ohana alludes to Walter Benjamin’s famous essay, “Critique of 
Violence” (Zur Kritik der Gewalt); yet, while Benjamin is discussed in the book, 
this discussion—like that of Hannah Arendt, described as the contemporary most 
aligned with Camus in his great contribution of an “ethics of limits”—is not recalled 
again in depth (only in passing). At times, it seems as if the author is cobbling 
together a wide-ranging set of ideas about Camus, resulting in occasionally 
repetitious material, re-organized perhaps from previous works, that is presented 
out of logical order. Moreover, certain instances of imprecise or awkward 
expression along with errors of fact occur, at least in the translated text (e.g., we 
learn that Camus’s life “embraced” the violence of the early to mid-twentieth 
century (1) and in place of “Indochina” we read of “Indonesia” (77)), which as a 
result has a distinct hint of unreliability. It is unclear whether these errors are on the 
part of Ohana, Maisel, or the volume’s editors. Along the same lines, there are 
citations missing where one would expect them, for example, following quotations 
by (unnamed) scholars. 
Given his sense of connection to Camus, it is understandable that Ohana 
minimizes or justifies Camus’s inconsistencies or what others might see as failures. 
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Nevertheless, many could still object to Ohana’s implication that all or most French 
people living through World War II, intellectuals or not, who were not members of 
the Resistance must have been either collaborators or just indifferent to the fate of 
Europe’s Jews. And, with respect to the Algerian War, Camus’s solution 
(federation of Algeria with France rather than full independence) might be 
criticized as unworkable, and not solely because the main parties were uninterested 
in pursuing it. These are among the important issues that could have benefitted from 
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